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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS--THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS UPON STATE REGULATION OF ITS BALLOT-Williams
v. Rhodes, -U.S.--, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968)-Ohio's election laws imposed
a substantial, if not insurmountable, burden upon a new or small
political party seeking to place the name of its candidate and its slate
of presidential electors on the ballot. This burden, the United States
Supreme Court held, violated the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause and infringed the first amendment's guarantee
of freedom of association. The Wallace case,1 in conjunction with
the parallel case, Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, - U.S. -, 89 S.
Ct. 5 (1968), presented the Court with a ".... question which may be
fairly classified as one of first impression: ' to what extent may a
1 Mr. Glen A. Williams was a member of the Ohio American Independent Party
and one of a number of petitioners in the case. The Party was organized during
January, 1968. Following the announcement on February 8, 1968, by former Governor
George C. Wallace of Alabama that he would seek election to the office of President,
the Party initiated a campaign to obtain sufficient signatures on petitions to give
the Party a place on the Ohio presidential ballot. Toward the end of July, 1968,
450,000 signatures had been obtained, more than the 433,100 required under Ohio law.
At this time, however, the Party was informed by the Secretary of State of Ohio that
due to the interaction of several provisions of Ohio's complex election laws, the
deadline for filing petitions for recognition as a political party was ninety days before
the date of the primary, or February 7, 1968, and not ninety days before the general
election. Therefore, the Party would not be given ballot position. Six days later,
on July 29, the Party brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. The three-judge court heard the case on August 19, and ten days
later it ruled that the Ohio election laws were unconstitutional because they denied
members of new and third parties the equal protection of the law. The District
Court, however, refused to grant the full relief sought by the petitioner. It ordered
only that Ohio make provision for write-in votes for Governor Wallace. Williams v.
Rhodes (reported sub. nom. Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes) 290 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.
Ohio 1968). The following week the Party petitioned the Circuit Justice for the Sixth
Circuit, Mr. Justice Stewart, for provisional relief pending an appeal. On September 10,
1968, the petition was granted and on October 7, 1968 the case was argued before the
Supreme Court. The Court's opinion was handed down a week later on October 15,
1968. (The case will hereinafter be referred to as the Wallace case, and all cites will
be to the Supreme Court Reporter).
* MacDougal v. Green, 335 US. 281 (1948), did contest the constitutionality of
Illinois' system of nominating candidates representative of new political parties. How-
ever, MacDougal was decided during the reign of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946). The advent of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny have sub-
stantially modified the constitutional matrix in this area. Fortson v. Morris, 385 US.
231 (1966), although concerning the constitutionality of state election laws, involved
consideration of a State's post-election procedure, not state requirements for initial
ballot qualification. [footnote by Chief Justice Warren].
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State, consistent with equal protection and the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of association, impose restrictions upon a
candidate's desire to be placed upon the ballot?" 2 Chief Justice War-
ren, in his dissenting opinion, underscored the importance of the
Court's answer.
The rationale of the opinion of the Court, based both on the
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of association, will apply to all elections, national,
state, and local .... I think it fair to say that the ramifications
of our decision may be compared to those of Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962) ... .3 (Emphasis Added)
But if the Court's decision is as important as the Chief Justice be-
lieves, it is because of the question which it raises and not the an-
swer which it gives; for
Both the opinion of this Court and that of the District Court
leave unresolved what restrictions, if any, a State can impose.4
Although it does not resolve the question, the decision discloses
the Court's intention to extend judicial review of the electoral process
another step beyond Baker v. Carr, 5 for, had it wished to, the Court
could have disposed of the case on alternative grounds without
reaching the constitutional question. It is, therefore, essential to
examine the decision and form some idea of the potential maximum
and the probable minimum content which the case may be given.
An understanding of the nature and origin of the statutory maze
which controlled Ohio's presidential ballot is important to an under-
standing of the case.6 Prior to 1948, Ohio, like most other states, had
provided three avenues to participation in its presidential election.
First, a candidate could have obtained ballot position under his
name and party label" for a slate of electors pledged to him by filing
a nominating petition, sixty days before the general election s signed
by "... . qualified electors.., not less in number than one percent
2 Wallace, at 30 (Warren, dissenting).
3 Id. at 27.
4 Id. at 30.
5 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
6 Due to their bulk the statutes involved cannot be reproduced here. The follow.
ing sections of the Ohio Revised Code Annotated (Page 1960) are directly involved:
§§ 3501.10, 3517.01, 3505.03, 3505.04, 3505.10, 3505.23, 3513.11, 3513.12, 3513.14, 3513.19.1.
7 The Attorney-General of Ohio ruled that "independent" candidates were not
entitled to have their party affiliation printed on the ballot, 1930 Op. A. G. Vol. 1,
No. 1855. But, apparently the Secretary of State continued to print the party affiliation
of "independents" through 1946, HumasL, OMo ELECTON STATISIcs OF 1946 at 169.
8 § 4785-92 General Code of Ohio (Page 1945).
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of the qualified electors voting at the next preceding general election
for the office of governor .... ." Secondly, a party or candidate could
have employed the write-in space which was provided. 10 Finally, a
candidate could have obtained ballot position as the nominee of a
political party."
In spite of the fact that this system had worked well for over a
decade, the Ohio General Assembly, probably as a reaction to the
candidacy of Henry A. Wallace, began, in 1947, to enact a series of
amendments to the election laws which by 1952 had completely elim-
inated the first 12 and second 13 avenues. Thereafter, all candidates on
the Ohio presidential ballot had to be the nominee of a political
party.
To be a political party, for purposes of Ohio's election laws, an
organization had to comply with numerous provisions scattered
throughout Title 35 of the Ohio Revised Code.14 These provisions
were designed to regulate the major established parties; they con-
tained no provision for the formation of a new party. Prior to 1948,
of course, this had not been important since new and third parties
had found the provision for independent candidates adequate, and
thus, only the Republican and Democratic Parties, who could com-
ply, had to comply with these provisions. Since 1952, however, all
candidates have had to be the nominee of a political party which
must have complied with these provisions.
Judge Kinneary, in his dissenting opinion in the district court,
gave a summary of the Ohio election laws which was adopted by the
Court. Under his reading of the statutes "The two party system is
not a cliche in Ohio, but a statutorily enforced fact."' 5 A more liberal
and far less burdensome construction of the election laws is, never-
theless, possible.16 And, in light of the interpretation given the Ohio
9 § 4785-91 General Code of Ohio (Page 1945).
10 § 4785-98 General Code of Ohio (Page 1945).
11 § 4785-91 General Code of Ohio (Page 1945).
12 §§ 4785-107 and 4785-91 General Code of Ohio (Page Supp. 1950).
13 OHio E-v. CODE ANN. § 3505.03 (Page 1960).
14 Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 3517.01-.03 (Page 1960).
15 Williams v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983 (SM. Ohio 1968) (Kinneary, dissenting).
16 Judge Kinneary, in his dissenting opinion, implicitly assumed that failure to
comply with any or all of the provisions governing political parties would automatically
have resulted in a denial of ballot position. This result, however, is not expressly
provided for in the statutes and the Ohio courts have decided neither what would
have constituted compliance nor what the penalty would have been for non-compliance.
Most of the additional requirements with which political parties had to comply were
burdensome largely because of the requirement that candidates for the "mandatory"
204 [Vol. 30
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election laws in Beck v. Hummel'7-the only case involving these
statutes to reach the Ohio Supreme Court since the post 1947 amend-
ments were initiated-it is quite likely that these laws would have
received a more liberal interpretation in the Ohio courts. In the
Beck case, the court said
All election statutes should be liberally interpreted in favor
of the right to vote .... [and later in the opinion] In the in-
terpretation of statutes it is the duty of the courts, if possible,
to give them an interpretation and construction which will
accord with common sense and reason and not result in a
grotesque absurdity.' 8
The Court's adoption of Judge Kinneary's construction of the
Ohio statutes is particularly interesting since it chose not to dismiss
the case under the abstention doctrine19 on the grounds that the
Ohio courts had not had an opportunity to pass on the application
of the statutes involved. Due to the stringent time limit placed on
the case by the late date at which suit was commenced such a dis-
position would, of course, have effectively denied Governor Wallace
and the American Independent Party a place on the ballot. It could
be argued that the shortness of time was the appellant's own fault.
But, insofar as the decision rests upon the right of Ohio voters to
vote for the candidate of their choice rather than the right of the
appellant to associate freely and participate in the election, this reso-
lution would have penalized the rights of the voters for the appel-
lant's tardiness.
Although the opinion does not reveal whether a liberal con-
struction of the Ohio statutes would have saved them, it does in-
party office could not have voted in the primary of another political party in the next
preceding four years (OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5515.191 (Page 1960)) and the require-
ment that persons who signed petitions to place candidates for the "mandatory" party
offices on the party's primary ballot had to be of the same political party as the candi-
dates (OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3515.05 (Page 1960)). In Bouse v. Cickelli, 97 Ohio App.
43 (1954), the court construed § 3515.191 to provide that "One who votes a party
ballot at a party primary becomes affiliated with that party, and such status continues
and such one is presumed to remain with that party until he changes his status by an
affirmative act." (Emphasis added.) Under the precedent of this case it could, there-
fore, be argued that the signing of a petition calling for the formation of a new
political party is a sufficient "affirmative act" to make one a member of the new
political party. If this interpretation of the law had been adopted, the burdensome-
ness of the law would have been reduced considerably.
17 150 Ohio St. 127 (1948).
is Id. at 139, 147.
19 See Railroad Commission v. Pullman, 312 US. 496 (1941).
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dicate that a state may impose some reasonable regulations upon
access to its ballot.20 The question is, what are they? Unfortunately,
the case does not answer that question. The majority opinion con-
sistently treats the sundry provisions of the Ohio law as a package; it
never delineates which requirement or requirements of the many
involved render the package unconstitutional:
Together these various restrictive provisions make it virtually
impossible for any party to qualify on the ballot except the
Republican and Democratic Parties.21
The Chief Justice's dissenting opinion called attention to this
aspect of both Justice Black's opinion and the district court's opinion:
Although both opinions treat the Ohio statutes as a "package,"
giving neither Ohio nor the Courts any guidance, each con-
tains intimations that a State can by reasonable regulation
condition ballot position upon at least three considerations-
a substantial showing of voter interest in the candidate seeking
a place on the ballot, a requirement that this interest be
evidenced sometime prior to the election, and a party structure
demonstrating some degree of political organizaton.22
But, not only has the court declined to reveal the content of its
decision by refusing to state with particularity the aspects or require-
ments of the Ohio law which created the unconstitutional burden, it
has not even revealed the standard against which restrictions are to
be judged. The case does make clear, however, that a State may not
effectively bar a new or third party from any possibility of participa-
tion in the election process. Beyond this absolute minimum a more
detailed examination of the case is necessary to suggest the potential
maximum and the probable minimum effect which the case may be
given.
Article II, section I of the United States Constitution provides
that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors. . . ." Although this may
appear to be a plenary grant to the States, Justice Black holds that,
like other express grants of power, this grant
... may not be exercised in a way that violates another specific
provision of the Constitution. (and therefore) . . . no State can
pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth
20 Wallace at 12.
21 Id. at 7-8.
22 Id. at 30-31 (Warren, dissenting).
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Amendment's command that 'No State shall ... deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws.' 23
The basic difficulty with the Court's opinion arises, however, when
it declares
In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances
of the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting,
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classifica-
tion. [see, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 . . . (1965);
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma . . . 316 U.S. 535 (1942)] In the
present situation the state laws place burdens on two different,
although overlapping, kinds of rights-the right of individuals
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the
right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion,
to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course,
rank among our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly
held that freedom of association is protected by the First
Amendment. [United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State
Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217 ... (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 ... (1963); NAACP v. State of Alabama ex. rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449... (1958)].24
This enigmatic analysis presents a problem, for it merges several
different rights making it difficult to ascertain what rights Ohio's
laws infringed. First, the opinion seems to state that a "right of quali-
fied voters" exists independent of the right of individuals to freely
associate. The opinion, unfortunately, does not give this idea sepa-
rate treatment in its analysis, and it is impossible to determine if it
regards this "right" as supplying a sufficient independent basis for its
decision. It would, of course, be helpful to know where in the consti-
tution this "right" arises. Is this a penumbral right engendered by
the equal protection clause, or is it in some way a derivative of the
first amendment?
Secondly, the opinion suggests that, in this case, a denial of
freedom of association has resulted in a denial of equal protection.
The difficulty with this approach is that the freedoms protected by
the equal protection clause and the first amendment, though not
mutually exclusive, are clearly disjunctive. A violation of either of
these freedoms may occur without a violation of the other. If, there-
fore, the Ohio election laws violated the first amendment freedom
of association, they were ipso facto unconstitutional and the fact
23 Id. at 9-10.
24 Id. at 10.
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that they also violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion was superfluous.
Justice Black, however, having initially framed the question in
mixed terms, continued to discuss the case in those terms, and he
concludes his discussion of the substantive issues in the case by
declaring
But here the totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a
whole imposes a burden on voting and associational rights which
we hold is an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.25
Since the traditional standard against which state action which
infringes first amendment freedoms have been judged has been dif-
ferent than the standard against which state classifications which in-
fringe equal protection have been judged, it is important to deter-
mine which of the two freedoms, merged in the Court's analysis, is
the basis for the decision. The equal protection clause, as the opinion
expressly recognizes, does not protect citizens from all classifications
by the state, it only protects them from invidious or unreasonable
classification. The reasonableness of a classification depends upon
whether it is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate
state interest.26 First amendment freedoms, on the other hand, have,
as the Court also notes, been considered ". . . among our most pre-
cious freedoms.. ." and any infringement of these by a state is per-
mitted only upon a showing of a compelling state need.27
Unfortunately, the two concurring opinions do not clarify the
ambiguity inherent in the Court's analysis. Justice Douglas, though
he discusses the guarantee of equal protection, makes it quite clear
that he regards this as a first amendment case.
The First Amendment, made applicable to the States by reason
of the Fourteenth Amendment, lies at the root of these cases.28
Douglas has in the past consistently refused to allow any infringe-
ment of first amendment freedoms under any circumstances, and it
may be the suggestion to the contrary in the Court's opinion was the
reason for his separate opinion. This explanation might be entirely
adequate were it not for the fact that Douglas also joined the Court's
25 Id. at 12.
26 Id. at 21 (Stewart, dissenting, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US. 420
(1961)).
27 Id. at 11, citing NAACP v. Button, 871 U.S. 415 (1963).
28 Id. at 14 (Douglas, concurring).
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opinion and for the fact that Justice Black has in the past shared
Douglas' view that first amendment freedoms were inviolable. In-
deed, in asserting the absoluteness of these rights it is Black's dissent-
ing opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar29 which Douglas cites.30 It
may be therefore, that, under the circumstances, Douglas believes
that Ohio has clearly violated both the equal protection clause, and
the first amendment, but he is not certain that the Court's opinion
rests on what to him is the more important violation.
Justice Harlan, who dissented in the June, 1964, apportion-
ment cases3' which were based upon the equal protection clause, con-
curs in the Court's decision. He makes it dear, however, that he
" . . think[s] it unnecessary to draw upon the equal protection
clause. ' 32 He would, instead,
... rest this decision entirely on the the proposition that Ohio's
statutory scheme violates the basic rights of political association
assured by the First Amendment which are protected against
state infringement under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 33
It should be remembered that Harlan-unlike Douglas and,
at least before this decision, Black-will permit a state to limit the
exercise of first amendment freedoms upon the showing of a compel-
ling state need.
Of course, the State may limit the right of political association
by invoking an impelling policy justification for doing so.34
Since he finds that ".. . Ohio has been able to advance no such justi-
fication .. ." he believes that its election laws are unconstitutional. 35
If the opinion of the Court rests upon the first amendment, why
did Justice Harlan not join it? Since he is willing to permit limita-
tions upon first amendment freedoms upon a showing of a compelling
state interest the suggestion of such limitations in the Court's opinion
should not have prevented his joining it, though it should have pre-
20 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
30 Wallace, at 15 (Douglas, concurring).
31 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly
of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 277 U.S. 633 (1964); Mary-
land Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
32 Wallace, at 16 (Harlan, concurring).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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vented Douglas, who will not permit such limitations. This suggests
that both Justice Douglas and Justice Harlan really regard the first
amendment language in the majority opinion as dicta and assume
that the majority based its decision upon the equal protection clause.
A great deal of light could have been shed upon the question
of the standard to be applied by a decision on the merits in the
parallel case, Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes.36 The Court, however,
ignoring the Socialist's prayer for declaratory relief, refused to grant
additional relief on the grounds that, whereas the American In-
dependent Party had immediately appealed the district court's grant
of relief, the Socialists had waited until several days after Mr. Justice
Stewart had held a hearing in the American Independent Party case
and had ordered additional provisional relief, and that in the inter-
val it had become impossible for Ohio to comply without seriously
disrupting its election. Both Douglas and Harlan, who regard Ohio's
election laws as a violation of the first amendment, make it clear that,
in spite of the fact that it is too late to grant actual relief, they would
grant declaratory relief.37 Justice Harlan, in fact, expressly states that
the state has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to
overcome the exercise of the Socialist's political rights.38
In spite of the Court's uncertainty over the standard it shall
apply, its resolution to extend judicial protection to all aspects of the
electoral process is indicated by the fact that the case could have been
disposed of on alternative grounds without reaching the constitu-
tional question. First, as was noted above, the case could have been
dismissed under the abstention doctrine. This disposition would, of
course, have effectively denied the American Independent Party any
relief since the Ohio courts could not have heard the case in time
for the election.
The Court, on the other hand, could have granted the Party
the relief it sought on the technical grounds that when it appealed
the lower court's grant of relief, the State of Ohio did not file a cross
appeal challenging the lower court's determination that the Ohio
election laws violated the equal protection clause. Thus, the only
question technically before the Court was whether or not the district
court had breached its discretion in granting only write-in relief.
The Court could have, therefore, simply concluded that under the
present circumstances, no candidate could hope to win by way of
36 89 S. Ct. 5, - U.S. - (1968).
37 Wallace at 15 (Douglas, concurring); Wallace at 18 (Harlan, concurring).
Ss Wallace at 19 (Harlan, concurring).
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write-in votes, and thus the relief granted amounted to no relief
at all. The failure to grant adequate relief could have been held to
be a breach of the lower court's discretion. The Supreme Court could
have then granted the only effective relief-ballot position-without
reviewing the district court's decision on the constitutionality of
Ohio's election laws.
If the Court felt that a disposition of a case of such significance
on technical grounds would have been ill advised, one additional
disposition which would have had only minor constitutional signifi-
cance was available. Under the Ohio election laws once a political
group became a political party it remained one so long as it con-
tinued to poll ten per cent of the vote cast for the office of governor
at each election.39 To become a political party, however, a group had
to secure signatures equal to fifteen per cent of the vote.4 This dis-
parity could have been found to violate the equal protection clause.
The Court may have chosen to reject this solution because it
might have implied an acceptance by the Court of the ten percent
requirement. By not relying on this disparity, however, the Court
lost the only disparity in the treatment of different groups which
appears on the face of the Ohio statutes. For aside from that disparity
in treatment the Ohio law seems to treat all groups equally. Thus
the invidious discrimination which the Court finds in the Ohio laws
must arise from the failure of the laws to recognize the differences
between various groups and make provisions for these differences.
This may reveal one reason why the Court fails to state the applicable
standards, since it is difficult to say how much and what kinds of
differences exist between groups and how much or what kinds of
difference in treatment the law must provide for in order to render
them equal.
The three dissenting opinions, by Chief Justice Warren, Justice
Stewart and Justice White, reflect the same uncertainty as to the
constitutional infirmity in the Ohio law that the majority opinion
shows. The Chief Justice argues that since the American Independent
Party did not make a real effort to comply with Ohio's election laws
and did not seek timely relief in the courts, the Court should not
grant additional relief in the eleventh hour. The lateness of the
hour is insufficient justification, in Warren's opinion, for ignoring
the Court's traditional practice of abstention. Even in first amend-
39 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3517 (Page 1960).
40 Id.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
ment cases, 41 involving a substantial antecedent question of state
law, he notes, the Court has previously ". . tolerated a temporary
dilution of voting rights to protect the legitimate interest of the
States in fashioning their own election laws...
The Chief Justice is also critical of the Court's failure to
establish a clear standard for determining the constitutionality of
the restrictions in this and similar cases, and he would have re-
manded the Socialist Labor Party case to insure the development of
greater clarity.
Whatever may be the applicable constitutional principles, [the
parties] . .. are entitled to know whether any of the various
provisions attacked in this litigation do comport with constitu-
tional standards. As demonstrated by Zwickler v. Koota, 289
U.S. 241 (1967), this matter should be first resolved by the court
below. Given the magnitude of the questions presented and
the need for unhurried deliberation, I would dispose of the
Socialist Labor Party's request for declaratory relief in a man-
ner consistent with Zwickler by a remand to the District Court
for a clearer determination of the serious constitutional ques-
tions raised in these cases.43
Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion disagrees with several
important conclusions reached by the majority. He is particularly
concerned with the Court's failure to analyze and resolve the ap-
parent conflict between the grant of power to the states to choose
electors in article II, section I, clause 2 and the equal protection
clause. His analysis suggests that the Court's opinion may represent
either the victory of form over substance or implicit over-ruling of
two cases.
The majority opinion, as we noted above, assumes that the
grant of power to the state legislatures in article II, section I is in
conflict with the equal protection clause. Justice Stewart believes
that the two provisions are not in conflict. He believes that this
grant, like all other constitutional grants, establishes an area of legit-
imate state interest. In this case, strange though it may sound today,
the legitimate interest is the right of the state legislatures to select
presidential electors without reference to the momentary popular
will. The state may, therefore, further this interest by means of clas-
sifications reasonably calculated to accomplish this. It does not mean,
41 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1962).
42 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 US. 713 (1964).
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964).
43 Wallace at 31 (Warren, dissenting).
[Vol. 30
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
of course, that under the pretense of serving such an interest the
state may employ invidious classifications.
Thus, Stewart's analysis does not suggest that the state could
discriminate against a minority group such as Negroes by saying
that no Negro could be an elector since there would be Negroes
who would be willing as electors to vote in a manner directed by
the legislature, and therefore, this classification would not be ratio-
nally related to the achievement of the legitimate state interest es-
tablished by the constitutional grant.
Justice Stewart is arguing that the Ohio election laws chal-
langed in this case are simply part of a scheme, albeit, an intricate
and complex one, which is reasonably calculated to achieve the legit-
imate state interest created by article II, section I.
In connection with this analysis it should be noted that the
court did not, at least explicitly, overrule either McPherson v.
Blacker,44 or Fortson v. Morris.45 The first of these cases recognized
that a state need not choose its electors by means of an election.
Nevertheless, the Court seems to agree with Justice Douglas' con-
clusion that:
It is unnecessary in this case to decide whether electors are state
rather than federal officials, whether States may select them
through appointment rather than by popular vote, or whether
there is a constitutional right to vote for them. For in this case
Ohio has already provided for them to be chosen by right of
popular sufferage. Having done so, the question is whether
Ohio may encumber that right with conditions of the character
imposed here.46
Exactly why a state may not impose restrictions upon participa-
tion in an election which it never needed to hold is not explained.
It may be that the Court, in light of the recent apportionment cases,
believes that the only rational election is an open election under the
one man one vote principle.
In Fortson the Court allowed the state legislature to pick the
governor when the general election produced no candidate with a
majority. If that can be done pursuant to the Constitution of the
State of Georgia, it is difficult to understand why similar results can-
not be achieved under article II, section I. It, therefore, seems rea-
sonable to suggest that this case has either tacitly overruled either
44 146 US. 1 (1892).
46 285 US. 231 (1967).
46 Wallace at 14 (Douglas, concurring).
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Fortson or McPherson or both of them or that it has severely limited
their potential application.
After dealing with the equal protection issue, Stewart notes the
ambiguity in the majority and concurring opinions as to the basis
of the decision.
The Court's opinion appears to concede that the State's interest
in attempting to ensure that a minority of voters do not thwart
the will of the majority is a legitimate one, but summarily as-
serts that this legitimate interest cannot constitutionally be
vindicated. That assertion seems to echo the claim of my con-
curring Brethern-a claim not made by the appellants-that
Ohio's statutory requirements in some way infringe upon First
Amendment rights.47
But, even if Ohio's laws do in some way infringe upon the
freedom of association, Stewart feels that the infringement is not
substantial enough to be constitutionally fatal. He argues that two
conditions must be met before there can be a finding of a violation
of the first amendment. First, it must be shown that the application
of the statute will clearly result in a considerable impairment of a
first amendment freedom. Secondly, it must be demonstrated that
the state interest being served is not insubstantial in the context
presented. This was in fact, Stewart argues, the test applied in
NAACP v. Alabama and Bates v. Little Rock 49 cited by the Court.
In the present situation neither of these prerequisites is, in
Justice Stewart's judgment, met. The Ohio statutes in no way seek to
prevent political dissent from organizing effectively, and they leave
political groups entirely free to assemble, speak, write, and prosely-
tize. In addition, the same argument which was used to show a legiti-
mate state interest for purposes of the fourteenth amendment is
valid in this context and, therefore, the second prerequisite is not
met.
Justice White's dissent is based upon the proposition that the
American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party both
failed to comply with a part of Ohio's election laws which is con-
stitutional, as tested against the fourteenth amendment. Relief,
therefore, should be denied, and the question of whether or not
the Ohio election laws as a package violate the Constitution should
not be reached.
47 Id. at 23 (Stewart, dissenting).
48 357 US. 449 (1958).
49 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
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... there is no suggestion in the majority opinion that Ohio,
merely by requiring potential candidates to participate in a
primary, has acted unreasonably.... Nor is it held that Ohio's
requirement, pursuant to this objective, that parties must show
their base of popular support by obtaining the signatures of
15% of Ohio gubernatorial voters is itself unreasonable ...
Indeed, the Party made no effort whatsoever to comply with
provisions. . . . That other Ohio provisions related to later
phases of the election process might have imposed unconstitu-
tional barriers to ballot position is no reason to excuse the In-
dependent Party from complying with those preconditions
which the state may validly impose.5 0
The full significance of the Wallace case cannot, of course, be
known at this time. If the case is as important as Chief Justice War-
ren believes, it is because it has opened to judicial review a whole
range of questions concerning state regulation of the electoral pro-
cess. Unfortunately, having raised these questions, the Court does
not really answer them.
At the very minimum the case makes it clear that a state may
not effectively bar new or third parties from any chance of participa-
tion in the electoral process. Beyond this minimum, however, it is
possible, due to the ambivalent analysis employed by the Court, to
argue either that the case is based upon the first amendment or that
it is based upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The difference between this two positions is essentially the
difference between permitting the state to adopt restrictions which
are rationally related to the attainment of a legitimate state interest
or only permitting it to adopt restrictions which are dictated by a
compelling state need.
If the strict first amendment standard is ultimately applied, it
would seem that the only restrictions which a state could impose
would be those without which it would not be possible to hold an
election. If, on the other hand, the more liberal fourteenth amend-
ment test is eventually adopted, it is more difficult to predict the
restrictions which would be permissible. Presumably, under this
standard, a state could adopt some restrictions, beyond those neces-
sary to the holding of the election, if they were rationally related to
the legitimate state interest of insuring a meaningful election. In
no event, of course, could a state impose as heavy a burden on new
or third parties as the Court found the Ohio election laws imposed
in the present case.
60 Wallace at 26-27 (White, dissenting).
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Though it would be frivolous to argue which of these two pos-
sible standards ought to be or will be adopted by the courts, it may
be useful to suggest some of the questions to which some court may
have to apply one or the other of these standards. How many signa-
tures on petitions for recognition as a political party may a state
require? How long before an election may a state require nominat-
ing petitions to be filed? May a state require new parties to elect the
same slate of a party officials as an old party? How many signatures
may a state require before placing a question on the ballot? Must a
state provide for independent candidates?
Although the answers to these and similar questions will depend
upon the standard which is ultimately adopted, one thing seems
dear. Under either standard, the state may not impose restrictions
based upon narrow partisan interests. This alone may of course
do a great deal to guarantee to each citizen the right to vote in a
meaningful election.
Joel T. Thomas
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE--THE EFFECT OF SECTION 2309.71
OF THE OHIO REvISED CODE ON OHIO PROCEDU .- In Ohio, section
2309.711 of the Ohio Revised Code became effective on Jine 11,
1 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 209.71 (Page Supp. 1967).
(A) At any time after commencement of an action a defendant, as a third-
party plaintiff, may file a petition and cause a summons to be issued and
served upon any person, including a co-defendant, who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The third-party
plaintiff need not obtain leave to file the third-party petition if he files it not
later than ten days after he files his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain
leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The person served
with the summons, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make
his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim and his counterclaims against
the third-party plaintiff and other third-party defendants as provided in
Chapter 2809 of the Revised Code. The third-party defendant may assert
against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the
plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against
the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
shall assert his defenses and his counterclaims as provided in Chapter 2309
of the Revised Code. Any party may move to strike the third-party claim, or
for its severance or separate trial. If the third-party defendant is an employee,
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1968. The statute creates a formal system of impleader long needed
in Ohio procedure. Prior to the enactment of the present statute,
defendants who desired to bind a third-party by the judgment in the
original action were required to "vouch in" the third-party,2 and
may still do so. The original defendant could vouch in a third-party
by giving him timely notice of the suit and offering to let him
conduct the defense. The third-party would then be bound by the
adjudication of the defendant's liability, whether or not the invita-
tion to conduct the suit was accepted. Third-party practice allows
greater certainty for all parties to the action by providing for the
litigation of the issue of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff in
the same action as all issues arising between the defendant and the
third-party defendant.
The new Ohio statute is not an innovation in the field of civil
procedure. The history of third-party practice dates back to the
implementation of general impleader practice in England.8 The
English statute was enacted as part of the Judicature Act of 1873. 4
The practice of impleading was adopted on a limited basis in the
United States in 1883 by Federal Admiralty Rule 59, which was
replaced in 1920 by Admiralty Rule 56.r Several state statutes" pro-
agent, or servant of the third-party plaintiff, the court shall order a separate
trial upon the motion of any plaintiff. A third-party defendant may proceed
hereunder against any person who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant.
(B) When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third-
party petition to be filed under circumstances which under division (A) of
this section would entitle a defendant to do so.
The third-party practice statute should not be mistaken for OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.191 (Page Supp. 1967), the joinder of parties provision. Under the joinder
statute, the plaintiff has the discretion to join one or more parties as defendants,
while under the third-party statute, the defendant may implead a third-party without
the consent of the plaintiff. It should also be noted that Federal Rule 13(g) provides
for cross-claim for indemnity against a co-defendant, while in Ohio a provision for
such a cross-claim is contained in the third-party practice statute itself.
2 Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmidt, 142 Ohio St. 595, 603, 53 N.E.2d 790, 794
(1944); Ohio Fuel Co. v. Pace Excavating Co., 91 Ohio L. Abs. 184, 189, 187 N.E2d
89, 93 (1963).
3 3 J. MooRE, FEDE AL PRACnCE, 14.02(2), at 441 (2d ed. 1968).
4 Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vxcr., c. 66, § 24(3).
5 Admiralty Rule 56, 28 U.S.C., which permitted a defendant to bring in a third-
party provided that the third-party was liable to the defendant by way of contribution,
indemnity, or otherwise for the claim made against him.
6 These states were New York, whose statute was passed in 1923; Pennsylvania in
1929; and Wisconsin in 1915. See Comment, Third Party Practice in Missouri, 23 Mo.
L. REv. 351, 353 (1958).
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vided for third-party practice prior to the promulgation of original
Federal Rule 14(a) in 1937. 7
Third-party practice provides for joining actions which ought
to be tried togther in order to save the time and cost of separate
trials and the resulting duplication of evidence. With only one trial,
identical evidence is more likely to produce consistent results., This
procedure also eliminates the delay between the two judgments.
Where two suits are necessary, the defendant in the first is often
required to satisfy the judgment prior to the determination of the
indemnity issue.9 Third-party procedure secures determination of the
rights of all parties concerned in one action and binds the third-party
defendant to the outcome of the main claim.'0
Third-party practice is usually employed in the following in-
stances: an endorser sued on a promissory note may bring in the
maker of the note as a third-party defendant; a guarantor of an
obligation may bring in the debtor; one who is sued for negligence
may bring in a third-party on a claim of breach of warranty; or a
joint tortfeasor may seek contribution from a third-party jointly
and severally liable with him." These situations are based on theories
of either contribution, indemnity, reimbursement or warranty. 12 The
third-party statute is a procedural rule and it does not give a third-
party plaintiff any greater rights against a third-party defendant than
otherwise exist under substantive law.'3 For example, in many
jurisdictions, including Ohio, there can be no contribution among
joint tortfeasors. This substantive rule is not changed by a third-
party practice statute or rule.14
With the recent adoption of the third-party practice statute in
Ohio, problems arise concerning how and when to implement the
act. The major problems are: (1) interpretation of ambiguous areas
7 3 J. MooRE, supra note 3, 14.01, at 411.
8 3 J. MooRa, supra note 3, 14.04, at 501.
9 Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1952).
10 See O'Neill v. American Export Lines, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); State
ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 20, 213 S.W.2d 127, 130 (1948).
11 Holtzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, Intervention and Third
Party Practice, 31 F.R.D. 101, 105 (1963).
12 Crum, Counter Claims and Third Party Practice Under the North Dakota
Rules, 34 N.D.L. REV. 7, 19-20 (1958); Brunsman, Parties-Joinder and Third Party
Practice, 44 ILL. B.J. 371, 377 (1956).
13 Crum, Counter Claims and Third Party Practice Under the North Dakota
Rules, 34 N.D.L. Rav. 7, 21 (1958).
14 Id.
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of the statute; (2) the applicable statute of limitations; (3) rules of
personal jurisdiction of the third-party defendant; and (4) the
proper venue.
I. INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS AREAS
A. Acceleration of the Time of Impleader
According to the statute, the third-party plaintiff may "cause a
summons to be issued and served upon any person ... who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."'x5
The statute accelerates the accrual of a right by allowing a third-
party who is not yet liable to the third-party plaintiff to be im-
pleaded. The right which is accelerated is not a right to relief but
only a right to bring the third-party before the court. A third-party
defendant may be impleaded even though such party's liability may
not arise until the defendant suffers the loss.16 This would be the
effect, for example, in an indemnity action against a third-party de-
fendant.17 The third-party defendant would not be liable in an in-
dependent action brought on a indemnity agreement until the
original defendant had suffered the loss. But in accordance with the
statute, the time when the indemnity claim may be presented would
be accelerated.
If the third-party defendant demurred to the third-party peti-
tion, it would be a matter of discretion for the court whether to
adjudicate the main claim first or the third-party demurrer. In this
situation as well as in most other preliminary questions involved in
the third-party action, the policy of the statute must be considered.
One important purpose of the statute is to provide greater certainty
for the parties on the question of ultimate liability. Since the third-
party claim determines who ultimately will be liable to the original
plaintiff, the more reasonable alternative would be to settle the
preliminary questions in the third-party claim before proceeding
to trial of the main claim. This procedure would have the added
15 Emphasis added to the Ohio third-party practice statute set out in note I supra.
16 Bill Curphy Co. v. Lincoln Bonding and Ins. Co., 13 F.R.D. 146, 149 (D. Neb.
1952).
17 Brunsman, Parties-Joinder and Third Party Practice, 44 ILL. B.J. 371, 379
(1956). See also Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Bldg. Corp., 199 F.2d 60, 63
(4th Cir. 1952), which considered the view that in some situations the defendant's
right to recover is contingent not only on a determination of his liability to the plain-
tiff but also on his satisfaction of the judgment rendered against him.
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value of providing a stronger basis for settlement or defense of the
main claim. The court should try to adjudicate the third-party claim
first to determine who will bear the ultimate loss. This party would
then assume the defense of the main claim.
B. The Meaning of a "Claim"
A section of the statute that may cause some misunderstanding
is the phrase "who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." In some jurisdictions the word "claim"
has been held to be synonomous with cause of action. The result has
been a rule that the defendant's claim against the third-party de-
fendant must be identical to the cause of action of the plaintiff.'8
If the word "claim" is equated with cause of action, this interpreta-
tion would limit the use of third-party procedure to cases of indem-
nity for the precise claim asserted by the plaintiff,19 and would ex-
clude such third-party claims as breach of warranty, negligence or
breach of contract. A construction which would produce this result
would not be in harmony with the underlying purpose of the statute
which is to dispose of all claims at one time in one suit. However,
an interpretation which would allow greater consolidation of actions
could greatly aid the courts in reducing docket congestion and the
parties in reducing costs, delay and uncertainty.
Other courts have adopted a more liberal interpretation of the
word "claim." 20 These cases hold that a third-party plaintiff whose
claim is founded on a different legal theory from the main claim
should not be excluded from the third-party procedure. The latter
interpretation seems more reasonable, since the main claim is never
completely identical to the third-party claim. This is because the
third-party plaintiff must allege and prove the grounds on which the
third-party defendant is liable over to the original plaintiff. This
necessarily injects separate issues into the case. The issue of the
availability of the third-party procedure might sensibly be deter-
mined by ascertaining whether there is a similarity of facts and issues
between the two branches of the case.
18 State ex. rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (1948); Craw-
ford, Third-Party Practice Under the Missouri Code, 19 U. KAN. Crry L. R1v. 16, 20
(1950-51).
19 Note, Third Party Practice Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7
U. CHi. L. REv. 359 (1940).
20 See Saunders v. Goldstein, 30 F. Supp. 150 (D.C. 1939); Watkins v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 29 F. Supp. 700 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
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C. The Plaintiffs Claim Against the Third-Party-Compulsory or
Permissive?
The next problem to be considered is whether a plaintiff is
compelled to assert any claim against the third-party defendant. 21
The Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex. rel. McClure v. Din-
widdie22 held it is optional with the plaintiff whether to accept the
new third-party defendant as an original defendant, since third-party
practice is permissive rather than compulsory.23 Federal Rule 14(a) 24
is essentially the same as the Ohio third-party practice statute, and
interpretations given by the Federal courts are indicative of how the
Ohio statute may be interpreted. Since the Federal Rule authorizes
impleader only of a third-party who is or may be liable over to the
defendant, the rule does not permit the defendant to tender a third-
party to the plaintiff on impleader on the ground that the third-party
rather than the defendant should be primarily liable.25 In the Federal
courts a defendant cannot compel the plaintiff to sue a third-party
whom the plaintiff does not wish to sue.26 The contention that the
third-party alone is responsible to the plaintiff may be used only as
a defense to the plaintiff's action and not to substitute one defendant
for another.27 It appears that a construction should be given the
third-party practice statute which preserves the principle that a
21 The language of the statute seems to be permissive rather than compulsory.
The statute says that "the plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party de-
fendant arising out of the transaction .... " (emphasis added).
22 358 Mo. 15, 19, 213 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1948). In discussing the question under
very similar statutory language, the court concluded
However, the sounder, better reasoned and more persuasive majority view
expressed in those cases is that plaintiff is not compelled to accept the tender
of the third-party defendant and amend his complaint to state a claim and
cause of action against the third-party defendant if he desires not to do so.
23 State ex. rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 19, 213 S.W.2d 127, 129 (1948).
24 FEn. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
25 Hull v. United States Rubber Co., 7 F.R.D. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
26 Delano v. Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Rutherford v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 7 F.R.D. 245 (S.D. Ohio 1945).
27 Brady v. Black Diamond S.S. Co., 45 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). The court
said at 339
Under Rule 14(a), F.R.C.P., the defendant cannot implead the third-party
defendant on the ground that the third-party defendant alone, and not the
third-party plaintiff, is liable to plaintiff. This presupposes that plaintiff has
sued the wrong defendant, which, properly speaking, is a defense, as plain-
tiff cannot recover a judgment against third-party defendant whom he has
not sued.
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plaintiff is free to determine the parties against whom he will assert
his claim.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BE APPLIED
Another important question in connection with the Ohio statute
concerns the applicable statutes of limitations. With respect to the
third-party cause of action, it appears that the statute of limitations
to be applied is the one relevant to the third-party claim, and not
the one applicable to the plaintiff's claim. 28 The statute of limita-
tions for the third-party claim often will not begin to run until a
judgment has been entered against the defendant or until the
defendant has paid the judgment.29 The claim which the plaintiff
asserts directly against the third-party defendant is also subject to
the applicable statute of limitations. But if, at the time that the
plaintiff wishes to assert the claim against the third-party defendant,
the statute of limitations has run on that cause of action, the plain-
tiff should not be allowed to amend his petition.3 0 Thus, it is possible
that different statutes of limitations will apply to the various daims
involved.
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The requirements of service of process must be met in a third-
party claim just as in an independent action,3 1 since there is no
ancillary jurisdiction of the person of a third-party defendant. For
this reason, there may be instances in which it will be impossible
for the defendant to assert a third-party claim due to his inability
to obtain service on the third-party defendant.32
Special problems will be encountered if the third-party defen-
dant is a non-resident of Ohio. In such a case, the Ohio long-arm
statute33 might be used. To utilize this statute the third-party defen-
dant must have the requisite minimum contacts with Ohio.34 If
these minimum contacts are absent, due process may prevent acquisi-
tion of personal jurisdiction in an Ohio court.33 The third-party cause
of action must be one that is specifically enumerated in the long-arm
28 Brunsman, Parties-Joinder and Third Party Practice, 44 ILL. B.J. 371, 380 (1956).
29 5 J. MoORE, supra note 3, 14.09, at 534.
30 Hankinson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 160 F. Supp. 709, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
31 Hook v. Hook and Ackerman, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 238, 241 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
32 Holtzoff, supra note 11, at 108.
33 Osno Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.381-.385 (Page Supp. 1967).
34 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 810, 816 (1945).
35 McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
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statute. The Ohio long-arm statutes include different causes of ac-
tion, such as the commission of a tort, the transaction of any business,
or entrance into a contractual relationship.
IV. VENUE
Some courts insist that a third-party defendant cannot be im-
pleaded unless he could have been sued in an independent action
in the forum county or district.36 However, it is the general rule that
the venue of third-party proceedings is determined by the venue of
the main action. In the case of United States v. A cord,37 the venue of
an ancillary third-party claim was held to depend upon the venue
in the main action even though the third-party claim could not have
been maintained as an independent action because of lack of venue.
Thus, it would seem that if the Ohio courts follow the ancillary ap-
proach and if service requirements3s are complied with and venue39
in the main action is proper, summons may be served upon the third-
party defendant in any county in the state or in another state, and
venue will not be in issue, having been determined by the venue of
the main action. To allow a defendant to object to venue would de-
feat the purpose of the third-party statute, which is to secure de-
termination of the rights of all parties in one action.
V. CONCLUSION
Third-party practice is a much needed addition to Ohio civil
procedure. A question may exist concerning the effect of the 1968
amendment to the Ohio Constitution on the third-party practice
statute. By authority of the Constitutional Amendment, the Supreme
Court of Ohio may enact rules of practice and procedure which will
supersede contradictory legislation. The legislature retains a veto
over these rules, but no longer has the prime responsibility for enact-
ing them.41 Impleading is now a widely accepted practice and the
36 Brunsman, supra note 28, at 380; King v. Shepard, 26 F. Supp. 357 (W.D.
Ark. 1938).
37 209 F.2d 709, 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1954).
38 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2703.01-.27 (Page 1953); § 2307.383 (Page Supp. 1967).
30 OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.32-.39 (Page 1953).
40 OHIO CONsT. art. IV, § 5(b) (Page Supp. 1967).
The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in
all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right . . . All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no fur-
ther force after such rules have taken effect.
41 Milligan and Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts Amendment to The Ohio
Constitution, 29 Omo ST. L. R v. 811 (1968).
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Supreme Court is not likely to change Ohio's rule. Third-party prac-
tice is a far-reaching innovation and an excellent method for avoid-
ing circuity of action, delay, added costs, and unnecesary lawsuits. It
not only a valuable procedural right of litigants, but aids the courts
in reducing their already congested dockets.
Robert A. Retske
